Development of the Russian socio-economic system: challenges and prospects
- Author:
- Sergei V. Ilkevich
- Work direction:
- Экономические науки
- Abstract:
- The chapter examines the phenomenon of strategic default within vertically integrated industrial structures during periods of liquidity crisis and declining profitability. The relevance is driven by the growing number of corporate conflicts between majority beneficiaries and minority creditors (bondholders) amid high volatility in commodity markets and the tight monetary policy of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. The aim is to deconstruct the hidden mechanisms of financial flow redistribution within holding structures that enable controlling persons to minimize obligations to external investors. The study considers profit tunneling instruments through transfer pricing, whereby a subsidiary is artificially transformed into a loss center. It also analyzes “reputational arbitrage” – the beneficiary’s choice between preserving investment attractiveness and the direct financial benefit of debt write-offs. The methodological framework combines agency theory, analysis of judicial practice in cases of subsidiary liability, and financial modeling of distressed investment scenarios. The materials are of practical interest to portfolio managers, risk management professionals, and lawyers specializing in bankruptcy. The findings allow for a more accurate assessment of the probability of managed default in private holdings and the real value of distressed assets beyond standard credit ratings.
- Keywords:
- strategic default, vertically integrated holding, expropriation of minority creditors, transfer pricing, asset tunneling, controlling person of the debtor, distressed investing, subsidiary liability of the beneficiary